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“I proclaim that I believe in nothing and that everything is absurd,
 but I cannot doubt the validity of my proclamation
 and I must at least believe in my protest.” (Camus, The Rebel)
Introduction
Through his life and works, Albert Camus touches on some of the most important paradoxes of modern civilisation. On the one hand there his existential nihilism, the very general argument that life is absurd and simply cannot have a meaning, as expressed most fully in The Myth of Sisyphus, yet still a resolution that the search for meaning goes on. On the other hand there is the biographical fact of Camus resistance against the Nazi occupation of France, and thereafter, the challenge he posed to the French socialist support for Stalin, particularly acute in the figure of Sartre. In order to resolve this apparent contradiction between a wholly relativistic philosophy and clearly courageous and value-driven acts, we must turn to The Rebel. Here, Camus suggests that “…every act of rebellion tacitly involves a value” (Camus, 19xx: xx). Effectively, the rebel opposes their situation, their society, but affirms something of their own self. Further, the act of rebellion implies a potential solidarity: the rebellion of one offers an avenue for collective action to many. 
	This conception of the rebel resonates strongly through modern culture: Rebel protagonists abound in film and novels, from Holden Caulfield and Dean Moriarty to Tyler Durden and Katniss Everdeen. These protagonists take a stand against an unacceptable world, uncertain of their moral ground, advancing the value of their self and offering the possibility of solidarity with others. Images of rebellion have been increasingly been used since the 1950s as a means of advertising (Frank, 1997). Social theory often replicates this conception of the rebel; for instance, Foucault’s formulation ‘I will not be governed thus’ (1997), or Butler’s conception of critique and subversion as a risking and transformation of self. This is not to say that The Rebel has been highly influential, but that Camus’ formulation successfully captures the core of rebellion as it exists, historically, in the West.

The Historicity of Rebellion and critique

Camus’ The Rebel is an extended philosophical meditation on rebellion in general, but also situates rebellion within the Western tradition, from the ancient prophets to his own contemporaries. Specifying the rebel as a historical type rather than as a universal one is a key point. Within a wholly abstract definition, rebellion is precisely that which exceeds and rejects existing social structures or cultural beliefs; somehow, despite having been socialised and wholly interdependent with others, the rebel is autonomous and rejects and opposes all around them. However, Camus quickly insists that the Western sources of rebellion lie largely in the Judeo-Christian tradition, giving little or no importance to Greek influences. Certainly, prophecy and Gnosticism are important forerunners to rebellion, but so too is ancient Greek Cynicism. Briefly, drawing largely on Michel Foucault’s analysis of the cynics (2011), I will argue that the legacy of Cynicism is of key importance in understanding contemporary practices of rebellion.
	A further concern here is critique; like rebellion, I argue that the critic is also a historical type. It may be possible that there are practices of criticism within almost all societies, particularly in moments of liminality where structures are subject to question (Boland, 2013). Certainly, it is important that critique is situated socially, rather than attributed to single individuals (Boltanski, 2011). Broadly speaking, historically shaped practices of criticism which circulate socially are enacted by individuals who form themselves as critics – and these in turn overlap with other social practices, for instance, rebellion. The affinity between rebellion and critique is clear: For Camus, rebellion is a stand in the face of the world, or in more sociological language, it is the transgression of the existing normative order. For Foucault (1997), critique is a stand against governmentality, an assertion that one shall not be ‘governed thus’.  More generally, critique can be understood as questioning and deconstructing existing ideological structures. Thus, rebellion appears to exist at the level of action and critique at the level of discourse, but action and discourse often overlap. Importantly, Camus and Foucault respectively suggest that rebellion and critique involve a risking and a valuing of the self. 
 What we may analyse as critique or rebellion is of course multiple, and attempting to impose a theoretical definition may even be misleading. After all, what insight do we really gain from highly abstract categories such as ‘transgression’, ‘normative order’, ‘deconstruction’ or ‘ideological structures’?  A genealogical approach to rebellion or critique proceeds with caution. Firstly, historical practices such as critique are multiple – many discrete practices may be termed critique or rebellion, and these practices are not immaculate but mingled with numerous others – so critique and rebellion may or may not overlap. What matters greatly is how social practices are in fact problematised, that is, how they are understood by real historical individuals. Secondly, there are multiple sites of emergence to any social practice, so critique and rebellion both emerge from the ancient world, most prominently from prophecy, gnosticism, cynicism, scepticism, sophism and so on, but in time they are consolidated and transformed in complex ways through new events – the Renaissance, Reformation and the Enlightenment, or new influences – science, technology, colonialism and so forth. 
Rebellion and critique are most importantly things which take place within societies. If an outsider transgresses the normative order of a society, they are an enemy or a criminal rather than a rebel – perhaps there actions are wholly in keeping with the normative order of their own society. Those who question ‘ideological structures’ or the ‘regime of truth’ from outside a society can be critics – for instance, colonisers who expose the ‘superstitions’ of tribal people. However, the more significant social practice of Western society is ‘immanent critique’, whereby people turn against the cultural beliefs or moral justifications of their own society, and expose them as ‘merely constructed’ or illegitimate. Often, immanent critique takes recourse to ‘transcendent’ or ‘universal’ elements, by appealing to science or moral imperatives or future outcomes, but these appeals are no less socially situated. 
Since rebellion must be situated within society it is very generally critical. Even ordinary crime, such as illegal music downloads, tend to be justified by a critique of the legal and economic order (ref, xx). Rebellion involves firstly questioning the ideological order, then finding it illegitimate, then seeking to oppose and expose it through individual actions. In turn, critique tends to be rebellious; a completely ordinary practice of life is scarcely reconcilable with critiquing the ‘ideological structures’ of society – although much critique can be articulated without engaging in significant transgression, particularly through social media and on-line forums. Thus, rebellion and critique are not identical but generally overlap. 




Ancient Greek politics and philosophy is animated from the 7th to 5th century by the concept of parrhesia; meaning to speak all. Initially an insult for a chatterbox who could not stop talking, the word parrhesia eventually came to mean something like ‘truth-telling’ (Szakolczai, 2003). There are many different ways of ‘truth-telling’, including prophecy and science (techne); however, parrhesia meant to tell the truth about social and political situations, even to those who did not wish to hear this truth, possibly risking the life of the speaker. Furthermore, the speaker stood subjectively for this truth, they did not speak in the name of a God or tradition or law. Political parrhesia could be articulated to the crowd, in the Agora, or to a sovereign. Articulating a truth, presumably unknown to others, is at least partly critical.
	A more philosophical meaning to parrhesia emerges with Socrates. It refers to the practice of the philosopher in telling people the truth about themselves. Through dialogue, the philosopher forces his interlocuters to examine what they think they know, and thereby help them discover their own ignorance. Socrates markedly has the courage to tell people the truth about their own ignorance, even though this is not popular, and even dangerous. Yet again, this is something of a critical practice, yet it is far from rebellion as it does not involve transgressions of the normative order. Indeed, philosophy could even be seen as an anti-critical attempt to establish the truth of a normative order rather undermining the existing normative order.
Cynicism however alters this philosophical parrhesia into a concern for the ‘true-life’ (Foucault, 2011). Certainly, philosophy was always concerned with individual conduct, but in cynicism the emphasis shifts dramatically from questions of knowledge and ignorance to the establishment of truth simply by conduct. Indeed, cynicism even calls the possibility of a relationship between discourse and truth into question, because of the emphasis it places on physical life. Most importantly, the ‘true-life’ of cynicism is transgressive and rebellious. The parrhesia of cynicism is a conduct of life which is a scandal to the polity as a whole, which calls the customs, beliefs and values of the polity into question.
Understanding cynicism historically is problematic. Firstly, there are few ‘cynic doctrines’, and many historical records are openly hostile to cynicism. Much of what we know about cynicism is derived from stories about legendary figures such as Diogenes and Crates. Secondly, many accounts tend to distinguish between cynicism in general which is denounced and despised and some form of ‘true’ cynicism (Foucault, 2011: 202). This continues today, for instance, in Sloterdijk’s distinction between Kynicism and Cynicism (1988). Similar ‘purifications’ of terms are to be seen in socialism or feminism or liberalism; there is a banal and misguided version followed by many others (always others), and then there is a genuine version followed by few; this is also the case for critique – Boltanski (2011) distinguishes between ordinary, radical and nihilistic critiques. So, the amalgamation of practices known as cynicism varies greatly. Thirdly, Greek Cynicism is not an ‘original’ philosophy, founded and elaborated newly, but is much of a piece with many ancient philosophical practices of world rejection and self-abasement. 
Nonetheless, Greek Cynicism is the point of confluence of philosophical styles of critique and a certain widespread rebellious or transgressive modes of life. Cynicism is a ‘stylistics of existence’ in Foucault’s phrase. The archetypal figure of the cynic is both a truth-teller who harangues people in public, but also one who lives transgressively, refusing all but the barest existence, a simple cloak for warmth and a bowl for begging. Cynics were a scandal to Greek society, yet to many commentators they were curiously banal, such figures had always existed and would reappear constantly, their philosophical doctrine was negligible, but their style of life itself constituted a basic philosophy in itself. Thus, Cynicism appears paradoxically both as the most banal of philosophies, an empty doctrine of refusing any social beliefs and customs whatsoever, yet as the core of philosophy, the ‘true-life’ which underpins all questioning.
What is the character of the ‘true-life’? Truth in Greek is alethes, literally, unconcealed, which is to express ‘truth’ by antimony. For Foucault, the ‘true-life’ of the Cynics is true in four key ways; it is unconcealed, unalloyed, unchanging and ‘straight’ – in the sense of being uncomplicated or ‘straightforward (2011: 217-219). Thus, the philosophical practice of the cynic is to conceal nothing, to live in public and carry out their whole life in public. Famously, Diogenes eat, slept and spoke in public, and did not even conceal his natural functions. Public sexuality was possible within cynicism, and Crates even made love to his wife in public. The cynic lived wholly in public, just like an animal – any adornment of cultural life is rejected as being effectively ‘untrue’, a form of artifice which is not found in animal nature. This animality was of course a transgression of Ancient Greek norms, especially the humiliation of begging, which was effectively worse than slavery – a fate that could be borne nobly. It is important to note that this appeal to ‘nature’ or ‘animal’ tendencies is not neutral but critical; it highlights the least appealing elements of animals, and neglects the fact that they create a home, procreate and often care for their mate and children, which the Cynics rejected.
The animal the Cynics most identified with was of course the dog, for the reasons above, but furthermore, because the dog was a guard who barked at strangers but welcomed friends. The dog is one who can discriminate, who can smell out what is false. This resonates with the Cynics power of wary discrimination between truth and lies, or between the ‘true-life’ and artifice. For instance, Diogenes, reduced to a cloak and a bowl for water, sees a child scoop up water in their hands and therefore he discards his bowl as a luxury. The dog is also a guardian, whose constant vigilance protects those around him, the position the Cynic takes with regard to the public. Metaphors such as the scout or the watchman are used to characterise the Cynic; they observe and then tell the truth. Elements of rebellion and criticism are intermingled here; for instance, a famous anecdote recounts Diogenes speaking publicly about Heracles, but then
“...the crowd around him took a lively pleasure in hearing his words. But dwelling, I suppose, on this final image of Heracles, he cut short his words, squatted on the ground and did something vulgar. The people then began to mock him, to treat him like a madman, and the Sophists resumed their din, like frogs in a pond when they no longer see the water snake.” (#36, Diogenes or On Virtue pg 240-241)
Here, Diogenes appears both as a master of philosophical discourse and rhetoric, able to silence the Sophists and interest the crowds, but subverts even his own success by transgression.
Another element is the paradoxical position of sovereignty occupied by the cynic. Despite being dirty, humiliated, exposed and homeless, the cynic is peculiarly autonomous, an inverted sovereign, or the king of derision – both in that they are derided and deride others. This is most clearly expressed in the encounter between Diogenes and Alexander – which is less important as historical fact, than as a cornerstone of the cynic legend. It is Alexander who seeks Diogenes out, professing that if he were not Alexander he would like to be Diogenes; the philosopher responds to the emperor by asking him to stop blocking the sun. Alexander’s sovereignty is revealed by Diogenes to be dependent on a vast court, an artificial invention, merely an external mastery over enemies and fragile – vulnerable to change. Diogenes’ sovereignty by contrast is independent from anyone, natural, an internal mastery of his own soul and cannot even be removed by his death. 
Thus, the conception of self that underpins cynical critique and rebellion is double; it is both an animal and a sovereign. This conception legitimises any individual desire as ‘natural’ and can reject all society and culture as an artificial imposition on autonomy. Based on this special valuation of the self, the cynic is engaged in a constant battle, testing and trying all the rules known to man:
“The Cynic battle is an explicit, intentional and constant aggression directed at humanity in 	general, at humanity in its general life and whose horizon or objective is to change its moral 	attitude (its ethos) but, at the same time and thereby, its customs, conventions and ways of 	living.” (Foucault, 2011: 280).
The resonances with Camus’ conception of the rebel here are perfectly clear. Cynicism combines rebellion and critique in a battle that is limitless, as no transformation of moral attitude can withstand further questioning and transgression. Furthermore, these practices are grounded on a distinctive idea about the human being as an animal sovereign, which eclipses the reality of human interdependence and the value of culture and tradition, without which we could not even speak.
Cynicism today
This brief historical excursus does not attempt to suggest that the Cynics are the single source of ‘rebel’ practices in the West, which would clearly be incompatible with the Genealogical method. However, it is clear that although the term ‘Cynic’ had many different meanings and connotations and is often used polemically, something of the cynic practice of life was recognised very generally as typical of philosophy in general. So, the diffusion of practices of rebellion and critique was quite general through the ancient world. Tracing its influence concretely is a difficult task; Foucault links it to Christian asceticism and early monasticism, and in the contemporary world to political revolutionaries and avant-garde artists. Of course, few if any live a recognisably ancient Cynic life-style, but the idea of a true-life shaped in a continuous criticism of society in general is certainly recognisable. However, rather than attempting to identify the contemporary cynics as individuals, I will turn attention to the several parts of Cynicism in order to show the proliferation and transformation of this attitude throughout the modern world.
1. Public: The Cynic life was lived out in public, exposed to the view of all. The emphasis on the public in contemporary society is inescapable, indeed, the public often appears as a cardinal virtue (Szakolczai, 2013). Remnants of cynicism can be identified in the modern opposition to privacy and tact; everything and anything should be discussed in the media, there are to be no taboo subjects. Furthermore, ‘raising issues’ is an achievement in itself, because it creates ‘public awareness’. Of course, in some instances this is a good thing, yet in others it may be counter-productive – or results may be mixed. For instance, discussing self-harm in the media may help some individuals to share their problems with close family members and return to health; yet media coverage also spreads the idea and image of self-harm.
The emphasis on the public as the arena of truth can also be seen in constant media intrusions into people’s private lives, or the generation of an impetus towards self-revelation more generally. The popularity of celebrity gossip magazines and the increasing use of social media to reveal one’s life on-line are closely interconnected. Finally, there is the political importance of public visibility in terms of ‘transparency’, which may occasionally challenge corruption, but also leads to a generalised ‘media circus’ of constant spin and impenetrable jargon.
2. Autonomous Animals: The cynic self is an autonomous animal in a very specific way outlined above. Of course, the contemporary emphasis on independence and individuality is well known, most clearly articulated in liberalism as an economic and social philosophy. Freedom from constraint, regulation and limits are strongly articulated across a whole range of issues, from human rights to pornography. The autonomous individual is imagined as a sort of desiring animal, who seeks out their own interests in the market. In terms of practices, this emphasis on autonomy can be seen in increasing social isolation, facilitated by technology, whereby people have less and weaker social ties, and these ties – to a home, a job or a partner, for instance – are fragile and open to revision.
The idea of man as a biological animal is also strongly prevalent in modernity, backed by science, especially popular psychology. Through this paradigm, individuals can make sense of their own conduct as motivated by physiological and neurological facts, which are explicitly supra-social. Thus, individual conduct can be explained and justified without reference to cultural values or any morality; for instance, competitiveness or sexual appetite, but also, paradoxically, social elements, such as peer-group formation. Between this and the liberal concept of autonomous actors seeking their own interest, the world becomes re-valued as the site of power-struggles and competition for scarce resources.
3. Transgression and Critique: Cynics revalued transgression as a trial of social customs, as an exposure of the artifice of culture. Law and custom have no validity in the cynical imagination, indeed the only possible limit on transgression is the autonomy of others. So long as people give their consent, as so long as ‘nobody gets hurt’, transgression is effectively heroic. An example of this is the consumption of illegal drugs, which is increasing throughout the world. Perhaps the prohibition of these drugs could be an issue for debate; yet the emphasis is on expanding minds and experiencing pleasure rather than petitioning legislators. Meanwhile, the suppliers of the drugs are often also involved in other crimes, from extortion to sex-trafficking. Besides, a complex debate is scarcely relevant, since the main emphasis is on transgression as an immediate and automatic good. Rebellious practices do not necessarily need to articulate their values, merely to challenge existing norms and institutions.
Critique is more prevalent than transgression practices in that cultural beliefs and social norms are more contested and challenged in discourse; the ancient Cynic insistence that life must mirror truth is not always followed. Sometimes critique is the precursor to transgression, for instance, in that children adopt critical discourses from culture to challenge their parents and community before setting up a new ‘true’ life. Critical discourse has now proliferated to an extent that makes critique paradoxically ineffectual and ubiquitous; there is no-one to stand in for the ‘mainstream’ or normative order – no target for critique but a cacophony of other critiques, liberal, anarchist, socialist, libertarian. Furthermore, centuries of critique mean that current beliefs, say in individualism, capitalism or rationality, are in fact the product of previous historical moments of critique. Thus, much critique is now the critique of critique, cynicism about cynics
Contemporary rebellion is clearly a critical form of rebellion; it is not mere violence or transgression. Cynicism is just one aspect of the Western history of rebellion, emphasising the value of the ‘true-life’ as animal autonomy from society. Other threads emphasise transcendent elements, universals or moral imperatives which justify rebellion. A more thorough genealogy is certainly helpful to understand the nature of rebellion in contemporary culture, and to realise that rebelling is not the solution to a social order based on rebellion.

